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This document reports the results of an examination of the submarine
engagement model SUBSUB, written by Presearch, Inc. of Fairfax, Vfi, and
modified for use at the Naval War College (NUJC), Newport, RI . This
model considers a submarine versus submarine interaction from search
through detection, classification, localization, closure, attack, and
counterattack. The submarine missions modelled in a\-e barrier patrol.
area patrol, and transit. The version of SUBSUB examined runs on an
IBM-PC. Other versions exist which operate on larger computers.
Purpose of this Study
The primary purpose of the examination was to assess the modelling
methods used in SUBSUB and to judge the program's usefulness for
seminar war gaming at NUJC. This evaluation was conducted using
documentation and FORTRRN source code supplied by Presearch, Inc.
fl secondary purpose of the examination was to describe the basic
models involved and suggest possible improvements or extensions.
Limits of this Study
SUBSUB is an extensive model, or more accurately, an integrated
collection of models. The examination considered in detail the available
documentation and FORTRAN source code for the search, detection, and
closure modules. The environmental and platform data bases mere not
examined.
SUBSUe Oueruiew
SUBSUB models one-on-one barrier, area, and transit search missions
for submarine platforms. It is an analytical model, as opposed to a
discrete time step simulation. The submarine can be assigned a variety
of current or projected sonar systems and lueapon capabilities. Each
platform is modelled in either an aggressive or evasive posture.
Countermeasures ^e allowed. Each encounter begins with detection
and continues through classification, localization, closure, attack, and
counterattack. Figure-of-merit inputs (target source levels and
environmental parameters) are drawn from a disk-based data base. The
version of SUBSUB examined contained only winter environments, but
others could presumably be added as necessary.
The program begins with the user reviewing the last selections for
environment, scenario, platforms, sensors, and weapons. Any or all of
these selections can be changed. The possible scenarios for the
opposing submarines (called Blue and Red] ^re: barrier search/transit,
area search/transit, area search/area search, transit/transit, and direct
support/penetrator.
When the user is satisfied with the initial conditions, the program
calculations dre begun. Outputs of the program include all input data,
nominal detection and counterdetection ranges (apparently the
maximum range at which mean signal excess is 0), and a sequence of
calculated probabilities for Blue and Red detection, closure, attack.
counterattack, and kill. Random variables uniformly distributed
between and 1 are compared to each calculated probability. If the
random variable is less than the probability, the event in question is said
to occur. The model then progresses to the next event in the
engagement event tree. For example, if it is determined that Blue
achieves a secure detection, the next probability calculated is that of
correct classification by Blue, followed by closure, localization, and
attack.
Detailed Model Description
Probabilit y Densit y for Detection Ran ge. For the selected location and
season, a propagation loss curve is retrieved from a disk-based
database. Using the passive sonar equation a mean figure-of-rnerit
(FOM) is calculated. The actual figure-of-rnerit is assumed to be
FOM = FOM + ?,
inhere £ is a normally distributed random variable with mean and
standard deviation specified by the program. Using the selected
propagation loss curve, a detection range is associated with each value
of FOM. In this manner a density function for detection range is
determined. (Figure I.)
Range
Figure 1. Probability Density Function for Detection Range.
The same calculation is done for the target, resulting in a density
function for counterdetection range. Although it is not clear from the
documentation or source code, the range associated luith each FOM is
most likely the maximum range such that propagation loss equals FOM.
fin implicit assumption of this model is that detection and
counterdetection ranges are fixed during the entire encounter at values
determined by probability distributions. This is in contrast to discrete
time step computer simulations using larnbda-sigrna or Gauss-Markov
detection models, where time-varying fluctuations in the environment
cause these ranges to change over time.
Distribution of Minimum Range Achieved during Search. If p(t] is the
minimum range achieved during the search from time to time t, then
P
C:p fl(t,R] is defined as
Prod {pit) « R}.
The functional form of P CPfl changes i.uith the geometry of the encounter.
In the burner search problem, P CPfl is assumed only a function of R. That
is, Pcpfl(R) is the probability that the minimum range achieved during the
barrier penetration is R or less. The calculation of P CPfl for barrier and
area search geometries will be discussed in detail later.
Probabilit y of Secure Detection (PCD ). The probability of secure
detection is computed by conditioning on the detection range of the
searcher. Specifically, if f
F;
(r) is the density function for detection range
and R CD is counterdetection range, then the probability of achieving a
secure detection by time t is
00
Prob{RCDs<r} fP,D(r) P CPfl(t/) dr.
In SUBSUB, DCD is evaluated by conditioning on the searcher FOM.
Letting r[v) be the detection range associated with FOM v and fpoM^J De
the probability density function for FOM, then DCD becomes
Prob{R CD ^r(pj} fF0M{v} P CPft(t,rM) du
This expression is integrated numerically. The probability of a secure
counterdetection is computed similarly.
This method of calculating the probability of a secure detection has
much to recommend it. Rs opposed to the procedures of reference [1],
this method incorporates the relative motion between the searcher and
target. Thus the probability of achieving a secure detection in an area
search mission will in general, be different from that in a barrier mission.
This occurs because the distribution of CPfl ranges is different for the
two cases.
The disadvantage of this approach, however, is the requirement to
perform a numerical integration. This slows the execution of the
program. But it should be noted that even the simpler, geometry-
independent method of reference [1] requires numerical integration [or
extensive table look up). It appears that this is the numerical price that
must be paid for secure detection calculations when detection and
counterdetection ranges are random variables.
If searcher has a significant acoustic advantage, then these
calculations are probably not necessary. In this case, the probability of
secure detection by time t approximately equals the probability of
detection by time t. But when detection and counterdetection
capabilities are nearly equal, then it becomes more important to
carefully consider the target's potential to counterdetect.
Barrier search PCPft From the SUBS LIB documentation, Pcpfi(R) for a
searcher conducting a barrier patrol against a target with a constant
course and speed is
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= .5((BlU-T)/2] 2 tan cr + (90-|:;-cr]7TR 2/360 if (BUJ-TJ/2 < R < (BUU-T]/(2sin (3)
or
R, = .5((BUJ-T)/2) 2 (1/tan (3) if R > [BUJ-T}/(2sin (3).
The other definitions are:
T = width of searcher's track,
BUU = barrier width (the target's penetration is uniformly distributed
over this Length),
V = searcher speed,






This expression is a modification of the "standard" calculations in
Kooprnan's reference [2]. The general computational method used t\^re
is to consider the barrier penetration in "target-stationary relative
space". That is, the target is assumed to be stationary, and all relative
speed for the encounter is provided by the searcher. The searcher's
relative speed component across the barrier front is the searcher's
actual speed,
V
Rnd the component of relative speed perpendicular to
the barrier is the target speed, V T . Then the probability that the target
comes within range R of the searcher during a barrier penetration is the
ratio of the mrea "covered" by the searcher in relative space during one
pass across the barrier to the total, area that could be occupied by the






























































Figure 2. Calculation of F|.pA for Barrier Search.
There are several problems uuith (3). The first is that (3) approaches
negative infinity as V T becomes small or R becomes large. The physical
explanation for this is that the method used to calculate the area of the
shaded region of Figure 2. (i.e., dividing the region into parallelograms,
triangles and sections of circles] fails for small V T or large Fi. The
mathematical reason for this behavior is that the second additive term
in (3) dominates the other tuuo terms in these limiting cases.
By way of example, Figure 3. is a plot of P CPfl , as calculated by (3), for
target speeds, V T , of 1 to 10 knots. Here R is 18 nautical miles (nm), V is
10 knots, Bill is 100 nm, and T is 60 nm. Since the actual P CPfl should be a
decreasing function of V T , the calculated values for V T less than about
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Figure 3. SUBSUB P vs.
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Figure 4. is a plot of P Cpr vs. range, R. In this example, V T is 5 knots; R
varies from 20 to 60 nm; and v , BULI, and T dre as before. Actual P CPfi
should be an increasing function of R (as long as P CPfl < 1, at least] but is
seen here to decrease for R greater than about 36 nrn.
Although not mentioned in the supplied documentation, the SUBSUB
code (in subroutine flCPRj modifies (3) so as to reduce the problem
created by large values of R. Specifically, when R > (BW-T)/(2 sin \3), then
P CPft is calculated with R set to min{R,(Ttan2|3)/sin(3}. This change
prevents P CPR from approaching negative infinity, but can introduce a
discontinuity into the function and does not prevent P CPfl from
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lure 4. SUBSUB P vs. R as in documentation and source code.
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Another problem with the approach used to derive (3) is that it is not
applicable for Bill < T. In fact, the Bill terms in the denominators of the
additive terms of (3) cause the calculated P CPfl to become infinite as BlU
approaches 0. The SUBSUB program does not warn the user that Bill < T
is not allowed.
fl third (and relatively minor) problem with (3) is that if the
methodology use to compute HI in the first two cases is followed for the
third case (i.e., when R >(BUJ-T)/(2siri [-:;]), then fll should be
.5{ ((BlU-T)/2) 2 (1/tan p) - (tan |3)(R - (BllJ-T]/(2sin |3))2 }.
However, as discussed above, using this methodology at all is not
recommended.
Alternative analytical barrier models q\'e; available which avoid
these problems and arp more general in their application. A good
example is the JOTS II (Joint Operational Tactical System] bdnier model
described in [4]. This model generalizes slightly the computational
method in Koopman [2] to estimate PcfrIxL the probability of coming
within range R of a transitor ujheri the barrier penetration point is x.
This probability is given as
11
PcprIx] = rnin {fix), 1} (4)
inhere
fl:
2RK/T for s< T/2 - RK
(RK/T) + (T/2 - |x|)/T] for T/2 - RK « Ixl 4 T/2 +R/K
(1/T) v''(R
2
-(|x| -T/2] 2)(K 2-1) for T/2 + R/K <: Ixl 4 T/2
for |x| >>T/2 + R
K = V'l + (V /V Tj^ ,
and x is at the center of the searcher track T.
If the barrier penetration point is given by a probability distribution,
gxlx), then
(T/2)+R
cpfi = J PcprM 9xM dx.
-(T/2) -R
[4.1]
Currently, the SUBSUB model implicitly assumies that the barrier
penetration point is a uniformly distributed random variable with mean
0. Using 14.1] allows any distribution of penetration points. For example,
an attractive strategy for the target would be to attempt to maximize
|x| (that is, penetrate as far as possible from the center of the barrier],
since fix] is nonincreasing in Ixl.
When the assumption of a uniform distribution of penetration points
with mean is acceptable, then it is possible to closely approximate (4.1)
with a closed form expression. There ere three cases:
12
P CPfl -
' mm {2RK/T, 1} for BLU < T - 2RK
1
- {(1/BUJ T] [rnax{.5(T+BUU] - RK, 0}]2} for T-2RK «BLU^ T+2R
((T+2R)/BUU) (1- [max{T-R(K-1], 0}]2 /(T2+2RT)] for BLU >, T+2R
i.uhere K is as before.
Barrier Search Probabilit y of Closure (P,:L I. The SUBSUB documentation
describes two different methods for estimating P CL , which is the
probability of successfully closing a target detected during barrier
search. The first method appears to compare the time required for the
searcher to approach to within weapons range using a bearing rider
track (i.e., the relative bearing of the target is always 000*] to the time
required for the target to escape out the bottom of the search area.
The angle R0BMRX is calculated, which is the maximum angle-on-the-bow
at detection allowing closure to weapon range before the target
escapes. Then based on a geometrical construction which is equivalent
to assuming a cosine distribution of target ROB at detection, the
probability that the actual ROB will be less than R0B MflX is determined.
This is taken to be P CL . Although appearing in the documentation, this
method was not implemented in the version of SUBSUB received for
review.
In the SUBSUB code (subroutine BCLOSE], a more direct method is used
to determine R0B MflX . But then R0B MflX is converted to P CL in a
nons tanda rd manne r
.
The program assumes that the searcher requires a specified length of
time (variable TIM] to conduct target motion analysis (TMfll.
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Immediately after detection, the searcher heads for where the target
iuil.1 be at the end of the TMR period. (The documentation differs from
the code by stating that the searcher closes down the initial target
bearing.) fit the end of the TMfl period, the searcher takes a corrected
intercept course for target closure. If the searcher can close to within
weapon range before the target exits the barrier area, then the initial
flOB at detection is determined to be small enough to allow closure. The
program iterates through various initial RGB's (first in 10° then in 1°
increments] until the maximum ROB allowing closure is found.
This much is straightforward. However, the program then converts
R0BMRX into a probability of closure in a fashion that requires further
justification.
One "standard" assumption (which is implicitly used by the first
procedure described in the documentation) is that initial flOB will have a
cosine distribution. Specifically, reference [3] gives the probability
density function of ROB at detection as
fie] =
5 coste - r). -it/z + r 4 s
.
otherwise
4 TT/2 + }•
where y - tarr^Vo/Vj] is the mean ROB at initial detection. Given a
density function for ROB and a constant R0BMRX , P CL can be determined
by integrating the density function from -R0BMflX to R0B MflX (which is
particularly simple for the distribution f(8) given above).
In SUBSUB, P CL is computed using f(0) when the searcher detection
range is sufficiently small (specifically, less than T/(20 sin(R0B MflX )}. Rnd
for larger detection ranges, P CL increases linearly to a maximum value,
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beyond which P CL is constant. The reasoning behind this is (apparently)
that the assumption of a cosine density for initial ROB is a poor one for
Large enough detection ranges. This is reasonable, but just how large is
"large enough" and how P CL will increase requires more justification than
currently appears in the documentation.
To conclude, the subroutine BCLOSE in SUBSUB appears to give
believable values for P CL , but the underlying model is somewhat ad hoc.
Further analytical justification or validation with simulation results
seems appropriate here.
Pr-Pft for Rrea Search . S UB S UB c a I cuLate s P CPft as fol Iow s
:
















= an "effective" relative speed,
R = detection range.
Problems with (61 include:
1. Target and searcher >5re assumed to be searching in the same drem
of ocean. This seems a very unreasonable assumption.
2. V
r ,
the relative speed between the searcher and target, is
calculated assuming that the target and searcher velocity vectors dre
perpendicular. The more standard assumption is that the angle between
the velocity vectors is uniformly distributed between and 2n. Then by





- l.l / ilJT I I. V n + v j i- / n v j COSO J UO
= [i/tt]
J
(v 2 + v T
2
- 2V vT cose)
1/2 de (7)
Evaluation of (7) using numerical integration might not be advisable on a
microcomputer. Ho iu ever, equation (7) is can be approximated by the




. 8 max I V Q . v y .1 + .62 I. v q + '/ j I ' .
3. Implicit in (6) is the assumption that the area searched the instant
the search begins never need be searched again. In effect, the search
area reduces in size from fl to [R-xrR2] at time + . This is consistent with
a target stationary in relative space but is inconsistent with the
assumption of a moving target which can migrate into areas previously
searched.
An alternative expression addressing the above concerns is
P CPfl(t) = (1
- inR 2 fl.5Tj/ffl sfl Tjj exp(-2RV rRSTt/(flsflT)), (8)
where Rs is the size of the searcher's patrol drea, R T is the size of the
target's patrol area, and RST is the size of area common to both the
searcher and the target. Also, V
r
is given by (7).
It is noted that neither (6) nor (8) model convergence zones. Rs a
minimum modification for convergence zone propagation, the vPr term in
(8) should be replaced with fl cz , which is the area of ocean giving
convergence zone and direct path detections. For example, if
detections are possible at ranges of 0-4, 30-33 and 61-63 nm from the
searcher, then
fl cz = tt4
2
+ TT(33 2 -30 2 ) + TT(632 -61 2] nrn 2
= 1423 nm 2
Probabilit y densit y function for trackin g ran ge. Equa tion ( 1 . 25) o f the
SUBSUB documentation gives the density function for tracking range
when the searcher has two independent sensors as
R
-co
inhere ^ D1(R) is the density function for tracking range for sensor 1 and
':}:- D2(R) is the density for the tracking range of sensor 2. (Actually, the
documentation gives the lower limit of integration as positive infinity,
but this is assumed to be a typographical error.) Equation (9) is not a
proper density function since it integrates to a value greater than 1
(with either sign of the lower limit of integration). The proper form for
(9) is
R R
offi] = * D1(R) + <t>D2(R) - 4>DiiR) /dJR') dR ' " *D2i R ) J 'MR') dR" . (10)
-00 -00
Probabilit y of Achievin g Track g iven no Counterdetection (TCP ). In the
SUBSUB documentation, TCD is calculated by conditioning on the range
required to achieve "track" on the target. In (1.27) of the
documentation, TCD is expressed as
J
(1-P CDlR)) 4> T f.R.I dR
o
= Prob{R CD < RtrrckL Nil
17
where
<t> T[R) is the density function for tracking range, R CD is
counterdetection range and Rjrrck is tracking range. Given the event
tree structure of the overall, program, it appears as if the correct
probability should be conditioned on the searcher achieving a secure
detection. That is, TCD should be
Probing < R track
I
^cd < RdI- (12)
fls long as the target has some secure detection capability (i.e.,
Prob{R CD < R D} < 1], equation (12) gives a value strictly greater than that
given by equation (11).
R suggested simplification of the SUGSUB model would be to assume
that TCD is some user specified probability, say .8 or .9, depending on
the searcher's capability to conduct passive target motion analysis. This
seems a reasonable assumption and would reduce the number of
numerical integrations performed.
Attack Probabilities
. Equation (1.28) of the SUBSUB documentation is an
expression for the probability of a secure attack (FCD). This probability
is calculated by conditioning on the attacker's launch range. The
equation is correct except that the integration should be performed
from minimum launch range to maximum launch range. This same
apparent error occurs in Figure 1-6 of the documentation.
Converg enee Zone (CZ ) Environmerits . CZ environments <^re modelled in
a nonstandard fashion in SUBSUB. It does appear, however, that the
final effect of CZ propagation on the SUBSUB calculations might be small.
In CZ environ merits, P CPfl is modified as folio wis:
16
P CPfl(R) =
P CPR(Rj if R<Ri
(PcpfllRl + PcPfl(Rcz))/2 if R>Ri
Here Rj is the maximum direct path detection range, and R cz is the range
to the first CZ. The justification given in the documentation is that initial
CZ detections will make subsequent redetection easier, so P CPfl should
be larger between direct path and CZ ranges. The result of (13) is to
insert a discontinuity in P CPfl at range R r See Figure 5.
Cu










Fiqure 5. P in a Convenience Zone Environment.3 CPA °
This modification of P CPfi appears odd considering that in non-CZ
environments Pi:;PR is a function of the searcher and target tracks under
the assumption that detection has not yet occurred. That is, P CPfl
reflects only search tactics and not approach tactics. Rlso the
discontinuity at range Rj is difficult to justify intuitively. Furthermore.
(13) apparently applies in environments with only one CZ. The
19
generalization to the muLtipLe-CZ case is not given in the SUBSUB
documentation.
It does appear that the effect of this modification of P CPfl might have
a relatively small impact on SUBSUB calculations, at least in the
calculation of the probability of a secure detection (BCD). This
probability is given by
00
Prob{RCD«r}fRDf.r]P CPFl(t..r)dr, 14)
inhere fRJr) is the density function for detection range In a CZ
environment, fR (r) mill be very near for ranges betujeen R z and R,:z ,
since most initial detections will occur either in the CZ or at the maximum
direct path range. But it is for those ranges between Rj and R cz that P CPR
is increased. So it appears that the CZ modification to P CPR may, in fact,
change the evaluation of (14) only slightly. This conclusion might
change, however, depending on how the rnultiple-CZ modification is
accomplished.
Analytical Models and Discrete Time Step Simulations
SUBSUB is an integrated collection of analytical models. For such
models to determine whether or not a particular event occurs, an
expression for the probability of that event is evaluated. Then a
random number, uniformly distributed between and 1, is drawn. If the
random number is less than or equal to the calculated probability, then
the event is said to occur. This is opposed to discrete time step
simulations (e.g., SIM II, IBGTT and ENLUGS], where the coordinates of the
20
individual platforms are moved during each time step and the status of
each platform (e.g., course, speed, depth, radiated and self noise levels]
is updated, fln advantage of analytical models is that, in addition to
determining whether or not the event in question occurs this time
,
the
calculated probability tells the user how likely an occurrence of the
event will be next time and all subsequent times. This could be
important if the user needs to know whether a particular outcome is a
low probability event or something to be expected regularly.
fln important limitation of analytical models is the possible lack of
verified and validated submodels to calculate the required probabilities.
For example, in SUBSUB one of the flSUU missions modelled is systematic
area search for a randomly patrolling target. There exists no simple,
generally accepted analytical model for this search scenario. What is
used in SUBSUB is a modified version of Koopman's random search
expression, even though the search tracks modelled may be anything
but random. It this a reasonable thing to do? The answer depends on
the particulars of the situation being modelled. If the relative motion is
dominated by the target, then random search is probably a good
assumption. If, on the other hand, the target speed is slow relative to
the searcher, then a systematic search model mould be more
appropriate.
Or consider barrier search. The model used in SUBSUB to compute the
probability of detecting a transitor assumes ill a constant speed search,
(2) the target track is orthogonal to the searcher track, and (3.1 the
barrier penetration point is uniformly distributed around a mean position
at the center of the searcher track. If it is desired to model any other
case then SUBSUB may not be appropriate.
21
Or if environmental conditions are changing with position or time (such
as in the marginal, ice zone), then SUBSUB would probably not be the best
choice.
Discrete time step simulations, on the other hand, dre more robust
and can generally consider more types of scenarios. If, for example, it
is desired to know if a transitor successfully penetrates a barrier when
the searcher conducts a sprint and drift search, the physical situation is
established (initial positions, courses, speed, ranges, and depths] and
one replication of the simulation is run. Either detection occurs or it
does not. fln advantage of this method is that the modelling can often
be simple, geometric, and straightforward (compared to analytical
models which frequently become rather esoteric]. The disadvantage of
this method is that it does not give a probability of event occurrence
unless many replications are performed. But for seminar wargarnes,
probabilities are often of secondary importance. What is of primary
concern is typically whether or not a particular event happens.
To conclude this section, it is suggested that there dre probably some
missions and scenarios modelled in SUBSUB which could be handled in a
more straightforward manner with a discrete time step simulation.
Conclusions
SUBSUB is a large program. It is a collection of analytical models
which address the phases of one-on-one submarine engagements from
search through detection, classification, closure, attack and
counterattack, find it appears to run reliably on an IBM-PC
microcomputer.
The basic structure of the program is a conditional event tree, which
is hard to fault. However, some of the component models do have
limitations or errors which should be addressed in the documentation
and subsequent revisions of the program. This report mentions some of
these problems, but there may be others which escaped notice.
In spite of the program's shortcomings, it is judged to be better than
the microcomputer programs previously used at NUUC to evaluate
submarine engagements. It is recommended that the current version of
SUBSUB be used by NUUC, but that the known errors be corrected and the
technical documentation formalized as soon as feasible.
One separate but related issue briefly raised was whether analytical
models or discrete time step simulations are more appropriate for
seminar wargames. There is probably a place for both. If analytical
models are used, however, it is very important to know the modelling
assumptions coded into the expression for probability of event
occurrence. These assumptions might be more restrictive than one
would like. Compared to analytical models, simulations tend to be more
robust and transparent to the user. However, they can take longer to
run and do not give the probability of event occurrence.
23
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